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A WATER STORY WITH ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION AND A DOCTRINE
FOR CHANGING USES
MELOSA GRANDA *

I.

INTRODUCTION

This is a story of how two rivers in the remote reaches of Wyoming
and Montana, and the underlying water, became a federal case before the
United States Supreme Court. It is an account of a local water dispute
whose resolution will likely impact the course of water law, and more
importantly, water throughout the entire country. The story is common in
the American West and around the world wherever the demand for water
has surpassed the supply; perhaps this is a never-ending story. Yet the
outcome was never predictable. The uncertainty was heightened by the
fact that the dispute came to the Supreme Court without the benefit of
any lower court’s analysis of the issues raised. There were also matters
of first impression; the possibilities for interpreting longstanding
doctrines to determine the legality of new ways of using water and new
water uses seemed wide open. In the chronicle that follows, the authors
present their assessments of the conflict, the outcomes thus far, and the
opportunities to continue developing the story. There are morals of the
story too; there are recommendations for wiser regulation and clearer
articulation of applicable legal doctrines. These Articles impart a sober
warning that without the Supreme Court’s timely guidance, the most
important natural resource, water, could suffer grave and irreversible
consequences.
Long before the dispute became important, the actors involved—
Montana and Wyoming—signed an agreement with each other and with
* J.D. 2012, Golden Gate University School of Law. The author would like to thank her editors,
Luthien Niland and Sofiya Feerer, and Professors Mudd and MacDonnell for their guidance and
thoughtful suggestions.
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North Dakota that allocated the rights to use the waters of their interstate
rivers. 1 They hoped that the 1950 Yellowstone River Compact would
“remove all causes of present and future controversy.” 2 Perhaps the
relatively uneventful course of agricultural “business as usual” in the
Yellowstone Basin can be attributed to a plentiful water supply that
never before compelled a need for judicial enforcement of the Compact’s
terms. 3 But in 2007, the very instrument that sought to avoid conflict, the
Compact, became the subject of conflict when Montana accused
Wyoming of violating the Compact’s terms. Montana’s allegations were
fourfold: Wyoming misappropriated water by increasing its irrigation
efficiency and therefore increasing its water consumption; Wyoming’s
groundwater withdrawals in connection with coalbed methane mining
were illegal; Wyoming impermissibly built new water storage facilities;
and Wyoming’s irrigation of new acreage was prohibited. 4 Unsatisfied
with Wyoming’s denial of any wrongdoing, Montana filed an action
under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. The Court accepted the
case. 5 To assist in the proceeding, the Court appointed a Special Master
who reviewed the facts surrounding the dispute, analyzed applicable
laws, and made recommendations to the Court. The rest is history in the
making, as discussed in the Articles that follow. 6 Specifically, the
authors focus on Montana’s first two allegations regarding irrigation
efficiency and coalbed methane water withdrawals. But first, it is worth
reviewing some legal background behind the Supreme Court’s unique
handling of interstate water disputes in general.

1

See Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663 (1951).
Id.; see also Michelle Bryan Mudd, Montana v. Wyoming: An Opportunity to Right the
Course for Coalbed Methane Development and Prior Appropriation, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL.
L.J. 297 (2012).
3
See, e.g., YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT COMMISSION, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 1
(1964), available at yrcc.usgs.gov/support.docs/YRCCAnnualReport1964b.pdf (“No matters of
allocation came to the Commission’s attention during the year. The two state representatives were of
the opinion that no determination of allocation of water between Wyoming and Montana was
necessary.”); YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT COMMISSION, TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT III
(1980), available at yrcc.usgs.gov/support.docs/YRCCAnnualReport1980.pdf (“No incidents during
the year required administration of the water in accordance with the provisions of the Compact.”).
4
Montana Bill of Complaint at 3, ¶¶ 8–11, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011)
(No. 137, Orig.); see also Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Montana v. Wyoming: Sprinklers, Irrigation
Water Use Efficiency, and the Doctrine of Recapture, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 265 (2011).
5
Montana v. Wyoming, 552 U.S. 1175 (2008) (granting Montana leave to file its
complaint).
6
See MacDonnell, supra note 4; Mudd, supra note 2.
2
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
While the Supreme Court most often serves as the final appellate
decision maker in reviewing a lower court’s decision, under Article III of
the Constitution the Supreme Court also has original jurisdiction “in all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party.” 7 In an action between states, the
Court’s original jurisdiction is exclusive. 8 Thus, a complaining state in
an original action must bring its grievance directly to the Supreme Court,
demonstrating satisfaction of a heightened standard for substantial
injury. 9 Should the Court, with its discretionary powers to decline any
case for review, 10 accept the case under its original jurisdiction, it must
function as both a trial and an appellate court. 11 In so doing, the Supreme
Court initially hears the case, reviewing the evidence for the first time,
and renders final decisions that are not subject to review by any higher
court. 12
To remedy the unprepared and unprocessed state in which an
original jurisdiction case arrives at the Supreme Court, a special master is
often appointed. 13 The special master may be a retired judge or an
individual who is an expert in the field from which the dispute arises. 14
The special master helps gather and present facts, formulates analyses of
how relevant laws apply to the facts, and recommends decisions for the
Court’s consideration. 15 These tasks may be challenging, especially
when legal conclusions depend on a mastery of the specific and complex
facts at hand; such is the case with disputes involving water rights. 16 It is
7

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (Westlaw 2012) (“The Supreme Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States.”).
9
17 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4054 (3d ed.
2011) (“The initial pleading must be accompanied by a motion for leave to file, which may be
accompanied by a brief. . . . If leave to file is granted, additional pleadings and subsequent
proceedings are ordered by direction of the Court.”); Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable
Apportionment Revisited, Updated and Restated, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 381 391 1984-1985.
10
Id. § 4042.
11
Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in
the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 656 (2002) (“The
delegation of trial tasks to a Special Master, followed by review by the Supreme Court, allows the
Court to operate facilely in the manner in which it is most accustomed—that of an appellate court
scrutinizing the facts and conclusions of an inferior actor or body.”).
12
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9.
13
Id.
14
Carstens, supra note 11, at 648.
15
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9; Carstens, supra note 11, at 654.
16
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 4042; Robert Jerome Glennon & Thomas Maddock, III,
The Concept of Capture: The Hydrology and Law of Stream/Aquifer Interactions, 43 ROCKY MTN.
8

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012

3

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4

260

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J.

[Vol. 5

the Court’s ultimate responsibility to affirm, reject, or modify the special
master’s recommendations. 17
The Supreme Court seldom exercises its discretion to resolve a
dispute under its original jurisdiction, 18 but it has done so for a number
of cases involving the apportionment of interstate waters. 19 Traditionally,
interstate water disputes are resolved not only through litigation, but also
through interstate compacts and, on rare occasions, federal legislation. 20
But when the latter two methods have not been applied or do not
sufficiently address the dispute, or when the parties have competing
interpretations of some terms or provisions, the Supreme Court accepts
interstate water disputes with relative ease. 21 Still, the Court will exercise
its original jurisdiction over such disputes only if they are sufficiently
severe.
In petitioning the Supreme Court for adjudication of an interstate
water dispute, normally a state must show by “clear and convincing”
evidence that the dispute is of a “serious magnitude.” 22 If a water

MIN. L. INST. 22, § 22.01 (1997) (“Water law traditionally involves state issues that are quite fact
specific and nuanced.”).
17
Carstens, supra note 11, at 655 (“Once the Special Master’s report is transmitted to the
Court, the Court exercises its authority in reviewing the report and revising or approving the
Master’s findings, conclusions, or recommendations in whole or in part.”); see Colorado v. New
Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 317 (1984) (a “Master’s findings . . . deserve respect and a tacit presumption
of correctness”).
18
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 4042. In the 2009-2010 Term, the Court issued a
decision in two original actions; in 2008-2009 it issued a decision in one original action; in 20062007 it did not dispose of a single original action. See id.
19
See, e.g., South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (exercising original
jurisdiction over action to compel equitable apportionment of waters of an interstate stream);
Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221 (1991) (adjudicating a dispute over an interstate water
compact); Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 567–68 (1983) (holding that the Court had original
jurisdiction to enforce the Pecos River Compact); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 (1963)
(noting that the Court “does have a serious responsibility to adjudicate cases where there are actual
existing controversies over how interstate streams should be apportioned among States”); New
Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) (Holmes, J.) (“A river is more than an amenity, it is a
treasure. It offers a necessity of life that must be rationed among those who have power over it.”);
Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 145 (1902) (exercising original jurisdiction over suit to enjoin
Colorado from diverting the Arkansas River).
20
John B. Draper & Jeffrey J. Wechsler, Gunboats on the Colorado: Interstate Water
Controversies, Past and Present, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 18-1, § 18.03 (2009).
21
See, e.g., Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1773 n.5 (2011) (“Our original
jurisdiction over cases between States brings us this dispute between Montana and Wyoming about
the meaning of their congressionally approved Yellowstone River Compact.”).
22
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921) (“Before this court can be moved to
exercise its extraordinary power under the Constitution to control the conduct of one state at the suit
of another, the threatened invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be established
by clear and convincing evidence.”); see also Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 188 (1982);
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compact or federal legislation does not provide the controlling law to be
applied, the Court applies a set of federal common law rules, or rather
principles of equitable apportionment. 23 In so doing, the Court balances
equities between the states. 24 This analysis includes a review of past
judicial decisions and each state’s water laws; other considerations are as
varied as physical and climatic conditions, water consumption, stream
flows, established use, harms and benefits, and water conservation. 25 If a
water compact does exist and is deemed sufficient to address a particular
interstate water dispute, the Court looks directly to the terms of the
compact. 26 A compact is not only an interstate agreement for defining
states’ rights to divert and use the waters within their borders; it is a
contract between states approved by Congress and embodied in a federal
statute. 27 Negotiators of an interstate compact establish the compact’s
terms to serve the needs of the parties, and in so doing may incorporate
preexisting doctrines of common law. 28 In these instances, looking
directly to the terms of the compact is not enough. The Yellowstone
River Compact is an example of such a compact, as it expressly adopted
principles of prior appropriation law. 29 A basic understanding of prior
appropriation law is necessary, therefore, to appreciate Montana’s
complaint against Wyoming, the Special Master’s recommendations, and
the Supreme Court decision.
In the 1800s, western states rejected the then- and now-predominant
system in the United States for allocating water rights. 30 For the western
states, the riparian water rights system, in which landowners have the
right to reasonably use any bodies of water adjoining their lands, was too
limiting on their ability to withdrawal water, especially for uses on non-

Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669 (1931).
23
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 4052; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907)
(referring to the applicable law in the first disposition of an interstate water apportionment case as
“interstate common law”).
24
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 4052.
25
Id.; New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931) (“The different traditions and
practices in different parts of the country may lead to varying results, but the effort always is to
secure an equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas.”).
26
See Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 690 (1995) (“[U]nless the compact to which
Congress has consented is somehow unconstitutional, no court may order relief inconsistent with its
express terms.”) (quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983)).
27
See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 46.01 (Amy L. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. 2011). The first
interstate water compact was approved by Congress in 1925. There are currently twenty-three
interstate water compacts. Id.
28
See, e.g., Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-231 art. V, 65 Stat. 663 (1951).
29
Id. art. I.
30
2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 11.01 (Amy L. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. 2011).
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adjoining lands. 31 The system of prior appropriation was thought more
suited to the water scarce lands of the West, and that system developed
under the common law of each separate state. 32 Variations in the priorappropriation doctrine from state to state existed then and persist today,
as prior-appropriation law has become largely statutory. 33 Still, some
general principles apply across states.
The doctrine of prior appropriation is often expressed as “first in
time, first in right.” 34 This means that a person in time who appropriates
some water for a beneficial use has the right to continued use for that
purpose, with priority over later appropriators. 35 A water user with an
earlier priority date can compel a user with a later priority date to refrain
from use until the senior user has fulfilled her water needs for her
established purpose. 36 Still, the senior user’s rights are not unlimited. A
beneficial use is commonly defined as agriculture, industrial, ecological,
or household; however, waste is excluded. 37 All water users are also
under the obligation not to harm other users’ water supplies by changing
their points of diversion, purposes, or places of water use. 38 Water
appropriators can require each other to use water strictly within the
confines of their rights.” 39 Yet even when the confines are legally clear,
the practical application of one’s rights can lead to water disputes of
31

Id. Eighteen states now follow the prior appropriation system; some of those states include
groundwater to varying degrees. Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 12.02 (Amy L. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. 2011).
35
See CHARLES J. MEYERS, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE
APPROPRIATION SYSTEM 4 (1971) ( “A property right in the use of water is created by diversion of
the water from a stream (or lake) and its application to a beneficial use. Water can be used at any
location, without regard to the position of place of use in relation to the stream. In the event of a
shortage of supply, water will be supplied up to a limit of the right in order of temporal priority: the
last man to divert and make use of the stream is the first to have his supply cut off.”), quoted in 2
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 12.01 (Amy L. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. 2011).
36
See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 12.01, 12.02 (Amy L. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. 2011).
37
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(4) (Westlaw 2011) (defining beneficial use); see
also Frank Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Law of Surface Streams, 12
Wyo. L. J. 1, 16 (1957) (“In rather recent times these concepts have been merged into a new rule—
that a particular use must not only be embraced within the general class of uses held to be beneficial,
or must not only be of benefit to the appropriator but it must also be a reasonable and economic use
of the water in view of other present and future demands upon the source of supply.”); Janet C.
Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western
Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 921 n.1 (“Though the codes differed in coverage and detail, all of
them incorporated certain basic concepts, including beneficial use as the basis of a water right . . .
and prohibitions against waste.”).
38
See MacDonnell, supra note 4, at 274 (referring to the “no-injury rule”).
39
Id.
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great significance.
And so the story goes. With original jurisdiction over the Montana
and Wyoming’s interstate water dispute, the Supreme Court and its
Special Master looked to the Yellowstone River Compact. They applied
principles of prior appropriation law and rendered their conclusions. An
evaluation of those conclusions and recommendations for further
conclusions is now in order.
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